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AFTER LEHMAN: INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL DISPUTES
— A FOCUS ON HONG KONG
Shahla F. Ali*
John Koon Wang KWOK**
ABSTRACT
Recent global financial dislocation has provided an impetus for exam-
ining effective avenues for the resolution of financial disputes.  Hong
Kong, like many financial centers throughout the world, has been di-
rectly affected by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  Its response to the
collapse has included a creative mix of regulatory strengthening and
government sponsored mediation and arbitration.  Each of these alter-
native mechanisms of resolution provides a useful case study of the
prospects of the use of ADR in response to financial crises.  The efficacy
of such interventions will be reviewed and options for the future devel-
opment of a multi-tier dispute resolution system in Hong Kong will be
explored.
I. INTRODUCTION: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
HONG KONG’S COMMERCIAL MARKETS
Hong Kong has long been a favored venue for international
business transactions given its comprehensive legal regime, stable fi-
nancial environment, and geographic position as a gateway to main-
land China.1  However, with increased business and investment
opportunities, the need for an effective system of dispute resolution
has become clear.2  In recent years, a growing number of disputants
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1 About Hong Kong, http://www.hkiac.org/show_content.php?article_id=393 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2011).
2 Andrew Kwok-Nang Li, Chief Justice, Speech at the Hong Kong Mediation Con-
ference (Nov. 30, 2007), available at  http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200711/
30/P200711300131.htm.
151
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903591
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\10-2\rgl201.txt unknown Seq: 2 18-MAR-11 14:50
152 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:2
are turning to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve
their financial disputes.3  This is largely due to the significant finan-
cial incentives of choosing mediation or arbitration over litigation.
While dissatisfaction with the cost of litigation is certainly one of the
primary drivers of this change, the dramatic increase in financial dis-
putes and resulting pressures on the formal court system has en-
couraged the development of a growing number of alternative routes
for dispute resolution in the East Asian region.4
Mediation in Hong Kong Commercial Markets
With the establishment of the Hong Kong International Arbi-
tration Centre in 1985, local and overseas disputing parties have suc-
cessfully resolved a growing number of disputes through both
arbitration and mediation.5  The recent Civil Justice Reform of 2009
has further encouraged the development of alternative dispute resolu-
tion in Hong Kong.6  With the implementation  of its Practice Direction
on Mediation (known as “PD 31”) on January 1, 2010, the Hong Kong
Court amplified its efforts to familiarize parties and their legal advi-
sors with the mechanics of the Court’s mediation regime.7  It is partic-
ularly noteworthy that one of the new case management powers
granted to the Court includes the making of an adverse costs order
against a party where there has been an unreasonable refusal to
mediate.8
Hong Kong has incorporated the approach to mediation as de-
fined in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Con-
ciliation (2002).  According to Article 1, mediation is defined as a
process “whereby parties request a third person or persons . . . to assist
them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute
3 Id.
4 Michael J. Moser & Yeoh Friven, Choosing an Arbitral Institution in Cross Bor-
der Commercial Arbitration, in BUSNESS DISPUTES IN CHINA 23 (Michael J. Moser
ed., 2d ed. 2009).
5 About the HKIAC, http://www.hkiac.org/show_content.php?article_id=392 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2011).
6 Gary Seib, Civil Justice Reform Update: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Me-
diation, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/RRGoverningHongKongReformsMay09/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
7 For a better understanding of the Practice Direction 31 and the recent Civil Jus-
tice Reforms 2009, see H.K. JUDICIARY, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS – PRACTICE DIREC-
TION, available at http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/doc/whats_new/prac_dir/html/
PD31.pdf.
8 Angus Ross & Amanda Seto, Can You Afford Not to Mediate?,  ALLEN & OVERY:
AREAS OF EXPERTISE (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.allenovery.com/
AOWEB/AreasOfExpertise/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&itemID=54689&pref
LangID=410.
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arising out of or relating to a contractual or legal relationship.”9  It
must be noted that, in theory, a mediator will not evaluate the sub-
stance of a dispute and has no authority to impose a solution upon the
parties to the dispute.  Mediation is considered a consensual and confi-
dential process conducted without prejudice.10
The first two parts of this paper, following a discussion of alter-
native dispute resolution in the Hong Kong commercial context, will
present a brief overview of the collapse of Lehman Brothers Group.
Building on this background, the paper will then focus on Hong Kong’s
experience of using mediation to resolve disputes between investors of
Lehman Brothers’ minibonds and banks as product distributors and
recommend some areas for further reform.  The concept of a “multi-tier
dispute resolution system” in Hong Kong financial institutions will be
discussed, and issues related to its design it will be examined.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LEHMAN BROTHERS MINIBONDS COLLAPSE
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code on 15 Sep-
tember 2008.11  Subsequently, eight Lehman companies were put into
liquidation in Hong Kong, including Lehman Brothers Asia Limited
(LBAL).12  The global financial crisis that led to the collapse of Leh-
man, the fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street, has been de-
scribed as a “once-in-a-century” event.13  Hong Kong, as an
international financial centre, has not escaped Lehman’s collapse en-
tirely unscathed.14  Although Hong Kong banks have weathered the
financial storm well in comparison with peers in the United States and
Europe, the immediate focus of public inquiry quickly shifted from
9 UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNICITRAL MODEL LAW ON IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONCILIATIONS WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 18 (2002),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/03-909
53_Ebook.pdf.
10 ALABAMA STATE BAR, MEDIATION: ANOTHER METHOD FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES
(2007), http://www.alabar.org/brochures/mediation.pdf.
11 Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces
that it Intends to File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition, (Sept. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_Ibhi_chapter11_announces.pdf.
12 KPMG, HONG KONG INCORPORATED ENTITIES (2010), http://www.kpmg.com.cn/
en/about/KPMG_news/Lehman_updates/Lehman_updates.html?TopMenuOn=4&
LeftMenuOn=5&NoChinese=1.
13 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON
ISSUES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO
LEHMAN GROUP COMPANIES, (Oct. 26, 2009), available at www.info.gov.hk/hkma/
eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf [hereinafter HKMA].
14 Id.
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large corporations to individual affected investors.15  Determining how
best to investigate, resolve, and in some circumstances, provide com-
pensation to investors for financial losses resulting from the fraudu-
lent or negligent selling of minibonds by respective banks became the
focus of  public inquiry.16  In order to provide background on Hong
Kong’s unique financial mediation scheme, the next section will focus
on the nature of the financial products know in Hong Kong as
“minibonds.”
What Are Minibonds?
Minibonds are structured derivative products linked to the
credit of certain specific reference entities that usually are well-known
companies.17 The term “mini” is indicates these bonds are sold in
smaller minimum denominations (as low as HK$40,000 in certain
cases – approximately US$5,000) which makes them affordable to am-
ateur investors.18  In return for the “investment,” the investors are
paid both interest and a redemption payout at maturity linked to the
credit of the reference entities.19  Such structured products are com-
monly sold to institutional investors who are more familiar with the
securities risks involved with this type of investment.20  However, as
evidenced in the Lehman Brothers incident, some structured products
were sold to amateur investors, and in Hong Kong, Lehman Brothers’
minibonds were actively distributed as retail products to lay consum-
ers since 2003.21
Lehman Brothers’ Minibonds – How Do They Work?
As discussed above, credit-linked minibonds are connected to
the credit of specified reference entities. In the case of Lehman Broth-
ers’ minibonds, the investment products were linked to the insolvent
United States investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings (“LBH”)
and issued by Pacific International Finance (the issuer).22  Lehman
Brothers Asia (the arranger) arranged for the minibonds to be distrib-
uted by retail banks to retail investors in Hong Kong.23  The proceeds
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEHMAN BROTHERS
MINIBONDS SAGA (2008), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/
2008/dec08/24820.pdf [hereinafter FRESHFIELDS].
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17.
23 Id.
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of the sale of these minibonds were then used by the issuer to purchase
certain US-dollar-denominated underlying assets (the collateral) se-
lected by the arranger on behalf of the issuer.24  The complication of
this arrangement arose from the swap agreement that the issuer en-
tered with Lehman Special Financing by which the issuer would pay
Lehman Special Financing a sum equal to the interest and other in-
come it received for the collateral.25 Simultaneously, Lehman Special
Financing paid the issuer fixed payments equal to the interest due on
the minibonds, which were then handed down to individual
investors.26
Two interrelated reasons explain why LBH ultimately became
the primary beneficiary of this investment arrangement.  Based on the
sale and purchase agreement of the minibonds, retail investors had to
bear the entire risk of default when any of the reference entities suf-
fered from certain credit events (bankruptcy, failure to make pay-
ments on specified indebtedness, or restructuring of specified
indebtedness).27  Therefore, while LBH was only obliged to pay
minibond investors a fixed return for their investment (around 5.1%),
it used invested funds to invest in high risk instruments or collateral-
ized debt obligations with the potential for returns far in excess of its
fixed return obligations, while placing all investment risk on the
minibond investors.28  Therefore, when the market was doing well,
LBH was able to make significant profits from its high-risk invest-
ments after deducting the fixed 5.1% return.  On the other hand, if and
when its reference entities collapsed, Lehman, under the minibonds
sale and purchase agreement, would be able to first compensate itself
for financial losses while retail investors would ultimately be made to
bear the entire loss.29
In fact, when LBH and Lehman Special Financing filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the U.S. on September
15, 2008 and October 3, 2008, respectively, this constituted an event of
default under the swap agreement, entitling the issuer to terminate
said agreement.30  Because of the termination of the swap agreement,
minibonds were redeemed early.31  While the reference entities them-
selves did not suffer a “credit event” upon termination of the swap
agreement and due to Lehman’s insolvency, holders of the minibonds
were exposed to (1) the credit risk of Lehman Special Financing as a
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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swap counterparty and (2) the market value of the collateral, which
was sold to redeem the minibonds.32  When Lehman Special Financ-
ing, a key member of the swap agreement, collapsed, the market value
of the collateral connected with Lehman immediately plunged to a re-
cord low.33  This, of course, negatively affected the value of the
minibonds.34
Investigations Conducted by Hong Kong’s Financial Regulatory
Bodies
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Hong Kong’s Se-
curities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) received complaints from in-
vestors regarding alleged mis-selling practices by Hong Kong banks.35
According to the SFC’s October 2008 Enforcement Reporter, mis-sell-
ing is broadly categorized into two classes.36  “First, an investor may
be given materially wrong information about a financial product, lead-
ing him to make an investment decision that he would not have made
if the correct information had been provided.  The second type occurs
when an investor invests in a product that is not suitable given his
financial position, investment objectives, expectations and risk toler-
ance level.”37  In Hong Kong, thousands of Lehman Brothers minibond
holders claimed that they bought the minibonds after being assured by
banks that they were low-risk products, only to see the value plunge
after LBH and its subsidiaries declared bankruptcy in September
2008.38
The Securities and Futures Ordinance39 and the Banking Ordi-
nance40 both place particular emphasis on the importance of protect-
ing investors and minimizing regulatory overlap and costs.  Under the
present framework, the SFC41 is the “lead regulator” for the securities
industry,42 while the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”)43 acts
32 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 What Have We Been Doing?, SEC. AND FUTURE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT REP.
Oct. 2008, at 1-2, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/public/en-
forcement/08/oct_08.pdf [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT REPORTER].
37 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17, at 3.
38 Id.
39 Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571 (H.K.).
40 Banking Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 155, (H.K.).
41 For a better understanding on the operations of Securities and Futures Com-
mission, see Securities and Futures Commission, www.sfc.hk/.
42 HKMA, supra note 13, at 26.
43 For a better understanding on the operations of Hong Kong Monetary Author-
ity, see Hong Kong Monetary Authority, www.info.gov.hk/hkma/.
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as the “frontline supervisor” for registered institutions.44  When an en-
tity applies to become a registered institution, the HKMA advises the
SFC on whether the institution is fit and proper to carry on the regu-
lated activities for which it seeks registration.45  After registration, the
registered institution is supervised by the HKMA and is subject to the
relevant regulatory requirements issued by the SFC and the HKMA.46
To facilitate more effective co-operation, the HKMA and the SFC have
a Memorandum of Understanding setting out their respective roles
and responsibilities.47 (Appendix One of this report contains a table
illustrating a brief guide to the division of responsibilities between the
HKMA and the SFC.)
In terms of banking oversight, the HKMA has 140 supervisory
staff in its Banking Supervision Department (“BSD”) to monitor the
daily operations of the banks.48  Given the financial fallout resulting
from the mis-selling practices adopted by various banks in Hong Kong,
the SFC and HKMA have undergone extensive internal overhaul to
reform their regulatory regime and establish new mechanisms to bet-
ter safeguard the future interests of investors.49 According to a report
by the HKMA concerning issues surrounding the Lehman Group Com-
panies, a few pragmatic recommendations have been put forward,
among which include the following:
1. Recommendation 3 - Public education campaigns regarding policy
objectives should be periodically undertaken, focusing particularly on
the responsibilities of investors, intermediaries and regulators.50
2. Recommendation 4 – The regulatory framework should be
strengthened to take into account the growth in the volume and com-
plexity of investment products sold to the retail public by Authorized
Institutions (“AIs”) and the change in public expectations and risk tol-
erance by investors particularly in the light of the Lehman episode.51
3. Recommendation 5 – “Health-warnings” should be attached to re-
tail structured products with embedded derivatives or to retail deriva-
tive products generally.52
4. Recommendation 6 – Uniform disclosure formats such as simple
“product key facts statements” and “sales key facts statements” should
44 HKMA, supra note 13, at 26.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 27.
48 Id. at 29.
49 HKMA, supra note 13, at 29.
50 Id. at 62.
51 Id. at 62.
52 Id. at 64.
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be required to be produced in respect of such products (and indeed
other retail investment products).53
5. Recommendation 7 – Consideration should be given as to whether
there should be restrictions on the use of gifts as a marketing tool to
promote financial products to investors.54
6. Recommendation 9 – The HKMA recommends strengthening the
coordination between the HKMA and the SFC, with the aim of setting
broadly consistent standards of conduct.55
7. Recommendation 13 – The regulatory requirements at point of sale
should be reviewed with a view to introducing mandatory require-
ments for the audio-recording of the sales process and ancillary
arrangements.56
8. Recommendation 16 – The regulatory requirements at point of sale
should be reviewed with a view to introducing mandatory require-
ments for the imposition of a cooling-off period between the provision
of disclosure documents and the closing of the sale.  Consideration
should be given to allowing waivers of the cooling-off period subject to
certain safeguards.57
In addition to the recommendations above, the report also sug-
gested implementing a “mystery shopper” program, where designated
investigative investment shoppers seek information on investment
products from selected bank branches and monitor the type and qual-
ity of information and advice provided by the relevant retail banks.58
Finally as part of its overall oversight efforts, the HKMA facili-
tated the establishment of a Lehman Brothers-Related Investment
Products Dispute Mediation Scheme, examined in detail in the follow-
ing section.59
53 Id. at 64.
54 HKMA, supra note 13, at 65.
55 Id. at 69.
56 Id. at 74.
57 Id. at 79.
58 Id. at 77-78. The mystery shopper program has recently been put into place in
Hong Kong.
59 HKMA, supra note 13, at at 6.
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III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO INVESTORS AND THE PROCESS LEADING
TO LEHMAN BROTHERS-RELATED INVESTMENT PRODUCTS
DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION SCHEME
(“LEHMAN BROTHERS MEDIATION SCHEME”)60
Since September 2008, thousands of Lehman Brothers
minibonds holders in Hong Kong have filed complaints alleging that
they purchased failed minibonds after being assured by their banks
they were low-risk products.61  The SFC and the HKMA investigations
continue to examine allegations of mis-selling by Hong Kong Banks62
and investigate internal regulations and sale procedures of banks in
relation to the Lehman Brothers minibonds.  Simultaneously, individ-
ual investors have three primary avenues to seek redress: i) litigation,
ii) settlement through established third-party institutions, and iii) al-
ternative dispute resolution, which will all be examined in greater de-
tail below.
A. Litigation
1. Small Claims Tribunal
Investors whose claims do not exceed HK$50,000 (US$6400)
have the option of bringing their case to a Small Claims Tribunal
(“SCT”) where investors can address the tribunal independently with-
out the need to hire counsel.  The upside of resolving disputes through
a SCT is the possibility of reaching speedy results with little to no legal
cost.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a group of 135 in-
vestors sought to recover their investment losses through SCTs.63  It
took three months for the adjudicators of the SCTs to hear all cases.
Following the hearings, the adjudicators concluded that the claims
should be referred to the Hong Kong District Court.  The adjudicators
believed that jurisdiction transfer was appropriate because the allega-
tions involved claims of banks’ liability and introduced new and com-
60  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., LEHMAN BROTHERS-RELATED INVESTMENT PRODUCTS
DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION SCHEME, available at http://www.info.gov.
hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_dispute_f.htm. [hereinafter LEHMAN BROTHERS
MEDIATION SCHEME].
61 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17, at 3.  See also Susan Field v. Barber Asia Ltd.,
[2004] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 871 (C.F.I.) (discussing common law tortuous liability and the
duty of financial advisors to their clients).
62 Press Release, Legislative Council Secretariat of Hong Kong, LegCo to Debate
Assisting the Victims of the Lehman Brothers Incident (Oct. 20, 2008), available
at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200810/20/P200810200198.htm.
63 See FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN INVESTOR EDUCATION COUNCIL AND A FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CEN-
TRE, CB(1)1127/09-10(01) (February 2010).
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plex legal theories.64  The adjudicators understood their decisions may
be used to determine the liability of the banks in future cases.  As
there was no precedent lending guidance to the SCTs, the adjudicators
considered it best if higher courts heard the cases.65
As a result of the SCTs decisions, many investors decided to
drop their cases due to the high probability of appeal and the prospect
of having to bear not only their own legal costs but those of the banks
as well.66
2. Litigation
Individuals who invested in failed minibonds also had the op-
tion of pursuing litigation, yet few elected to do so in the immediate
aftermath of the collapse.  The most apparent reason why investors
did not choose to bring their case for litigation largely centered on the
high costs of litigation.  As mentioned in the previous section, the
chance of appeal was extremely high.  If the court found in favor of the
banks, the investors would not only have to pay their own legal costs,
but those of the banks’ as well.67  Such daunting consequences de-
terred many investors from even attempting litigation.  Furthermore,
whether the banks were legally at fault was a question of fact that
remained to be determined by the regulatory bodies.  Some observers
noted that a leading case on common law tortious liability, Field v.
Barber Asia,68 could be examined to consider whether Lehman Broth-
ers investors could recover damages for allegedly mis-selling the
64 Id.
65 Chan Bing Woon & Tan Khain Sein Oscar, How Mediation Can Help Corpora-
tions Survive the Recession, AMA Conference (2009), available at http://www.
asianmediationassociation.org/conference/pdf/AMA%20Conference%202009%20-
%20How%20Mediation%20Can%20Help%20Corporations%20Survive%20Reces-
sion%20by%20Chan%20Bing%20Woon.pdf.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Field v. Barber Asia Ltd., Court of First Instance of Hong Kong (HCA 7119/
2000, June 17, 2003), available at http://www.hklii.org/cgi-hklii/disp.pl/hk/jud/eng/
hkcfi/2003/HCA007119_2000-24179.html.  “Ms[.] Field’s complaint is that she was
an inexperienced investor, and from the outset made it clear to Mr[.] Barber that
she wanted to invest her savings, which represented substantially all of her capi-
tal, in a conservative way. . . .   Notwithstanding this, Mr[.] Barber advised her to
enter into an investment structure which was unsuitable for her and inconsistent
with her objectives, in that it involved risk of a significant loss of her capital, with-
out explaining to her the nature of the risk involved.”  Unfortunately for Ms. Field,
as the yen strengthened, her corresponding liabilities increased causing her to suf-
fer a loss.  The court found that Mr. Barber had been negligent in advising Ms.
Field because he  failed to heed her stated desire to adopt a conservative invest-
ment strategy and to warn her of the existence and nature of the risk involved
and, as such, breached its duty of care to Ms. Field.
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minibonds or whether they made their investment decisions with their
eyes open.  Since the SFC and HKMA have yet to conclude their inves-
tigation, litigation against participating banks would have been con-
sidered hasty.
3. Class Action in the United States
Because class action lawsuits are not yet available in Hong
Kong,69 seven plaintiffs from Hong Kong and the United States filed a
class action in the United States, contending that HSBC (USA) had
failed to protect the interest of its investors by redeeming its collateral
(i.e. securities held by both HSBC and the Bank of New York Mellon
Corp.) and therefore breached its duties as a trustee.  It is estimated
that the waiting time for trial will be three years, and eighteen percent
of any potential remedy will be deducted to cover legal fees.70
B. Settlement Through Established Third-Party Institutions in
Hong Kong
1. The Securities and Futures Commission and Hong Kong
Monetary Authority
The SFC and HKMA play an important role in regulating fi-
nancial institutions in Hong Kong and investigating possible wrongdo-
ings on the part of the banking industry.71  Notwithstanding the
power of the SFC and HKMA to investigate complaints and take disci-
plinary action against intermediaries pursuant to section 196 of the
Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chap. 571),72 individuals cannot
directly seek redress or compensation from these institutions.  Rather,
complainants should clarify their allegations and collect background
information for HKMA so that it may conduct a proper assessment on
the regulated entity.73 While the HKMA, upon consultation with the
69 A proposal for a class action led by Mr. Anthony Neoh, SC is currently being
considered by the Hong Kong courts. See Anthony Neoh, SC, Class Actions: Con-
sultation Paper, The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, available at http://
www.hkreform.gov/hk.en/docs.classactions_e.pdf.
70 Woon & Oscar, supra note 65, at 6.
71 See H.K. MONETARY AUTH., BANKING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, IN-
VESTIGATORY AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESSES (LEHMAN-RELATED PRODUCTS) (2009),
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/enforcement_process.
pdf [hereinafter HKMA LEHMAN].
72 Section 196 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chap. 571) discusses the
disciplinary action with respect to registered institutions that can be initiated by
the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC).  Securities and Futures Ordinance,
Chap. 571, §196, available at http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/571/s196.html
[hereinafter SFO].
73 HKMA LEHMAN, supra note 71.
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SFC, can implement disciplinary sanctions and even de-list a regis-
tered entity,74 it provides no commercial incentive for complainants to
invest personal time and resources in pursuit of regulatory sanctions.
A recent proposal currently being considered seeks to expand
the SFC and HKMA’s scope of power in order to allow these institu-
tions to provide compensation to aggrieved investors.75  The benefit of
this proposal is three-fold.  While it would offer an additional route of
redress for future investors, it would also provide greater financial in-
centives for investors to assist the SFC and HKMA based on the possi-
bility of receiving compensation.  Finally, this proposal would draw on
the already robust investigatory and regulatory framework of the SFC
and HKMA.76
2. Financial Ombudsman Service in Hong Kong
There is currently no financial ombudsman service in Hong
Kong.  However, consultations on the establishment of such an institu-
tion are currently underway.77  Based on the experience of other coun-
tries, these dispute resolution mechanisms should provide low cost and
useful investigatory and resolution services to customers and market
participants in the financial sector.
The United Kingdom established a Financial Ombudsman Ser-
vice that handles disputes in the financial sector and provides free and
independent dispute resolution services to consumers.78  According to
the UK Service, consumers retain their right to go to court if they are
not satisfied with the Ombudsman’s decision.79  If the decision is ac-
cepted, then it is binding on both the consumer and the financial insti-
tution.80  However, the Ombudsman does not have the power to
punish or fine financial institutions for non-compliance with decisions.
Therefore, it remains the role of the court to impose legal sanctions for
any subsequent misconduct following the settlement decision.81  This
practice is similar to the approach used in mediation.  Once a mediator
assists parties in formulating a legally-binding agreement, it lies with
the court to sanction parties for failure to honor the agreement.
74 SFO, supra note 72.
75 HKMA, supra note 13, at 79-80.
76 Id.
77 Financial Ombudsman Consultation to Launch,  (May 23, 2009), available at
http://archive.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/category/businessandfinance/090523/
html/090523en03002.htm  [hereinafter Financial Ombudsman].
78 HKMA, supra note 13, at 80.
79 Id. .
80 Id. at 79-80.
81 Id.
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Between April 1, 2007 and March 31, 2008, the Financial
Ombudsman Service in the United Kingdom resolved 99,699 cases.82
In Singapore, 417 cases were resolved via Ombudsman services be-
tween July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008.  According to statistics, nintey-
two percent of the UK cases were resolved by mediation or recom-
mended settlements, and eighty-three percent of the Singaporean
cases were resolved by mediation.83
A similar independent body in Hong Kong could provide an ef-
ficient means to adjudicate or settle disputes and shift some of the ad-
ministrative burden away from the SFC and HKMA.  If a Financial
Ombudsman Service is to be launched in Hong Kong, it must draft and
implement an effective roadmap outlining the distribution of work
among the SFC, HKMA, Hong Kong Mediation Council (“HKMC”), and
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”).  Another
possible approach may be to increase the scope of power currently en-
joyed by the HKIAC and allow it to fully adjudicate or settle disputes
based on the results of investigation conducted by HKMA and SFC.
Implementing a Financial Ombudsman Service or widening
the power of HKMA or HKIAC appear to be beneficial approaches to
the resolution of financial disputes given experience gained in the UK
and Singapore.  The recent proposal to develop a Financial
Ombudsman Service in Hong Kong reflects a growing need to enhance
financial-system management and provide greater avenues for the use
of appropriate methods of dispute resolution in Hong Kong’s dynamic
financial sector.84
3. The “Buy-Back” Proposal
On October 6, 2008, the Hong Kong government proposed a
“buy-back” option, offering consumers the option of re-selling their
Lehman Brothers minibonds.85  This proposal was subsequently
agreed to by the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB).86  Unfortu-
nately, the proposal failed after Lehman’s United States counsel is-
sued a cease-and-desist order to HSBC Hong Kong, as a result of the
automatic stay imposed by Lehman’s United States bankruptcy
filings.87
82 Id.
83 HKMA, supra note 13, at 79-80.
84 Financial Ombudsman, supra note 77.
85 Banks to Buy Back Lehman Mini-bonds, THE STANDARD, October 17, 2008,
available at http://thestandard.com.hk/breaking_news_detail.asp?id=8097.
86 Id.
87 FRESHFIELDS, supra note 17, at 3.
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C. Alternative Dispute Resolution
1. Direct Settlement Negotiation
Given the significant obstacles to pursuing claims through the
six possible remedies listed above — either due to high cost (i.e. small
claims tribunal or litigation) or unavailability (i.e. class action in Hong
Kong, direct compensation from the SFC and the HKMA, Financial
Ombudsman Service, or the “Buy-Back” proposal) — Hong Kong inves-
tors have largely attempted to directly approach banks for settlement
negotiations.88
Hong Kong banks have proactively identified and settled some
individual cases to reduce the likelihood of successful suits against
them.89  Unfortunately for aggrieved investors who lack the resources
to litigate or who have weaker claims, banks have generally refused
negotiation.  In other words, while direct settlement negotiation may
be the most “cost-effective” way to seek compensation, retail banks,
without external pressure and influence, are seldom willing to negoti-
ate with investors seeking settlement.
2. Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Products Dispute Mediation
and Arbitration Scheme
On October 31, 2008, the HKMA appointed the HKIAC to be
the service provider for the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment
Products Disputes Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (“IPDMAS”).90
Under this Scheme mediation and arbitration services are provided to
aggrieved investors seeking financial redress from banks.  With strong
support and oversight by the HKMA, the SFC and the Legislative
Council, the Scheme successfully launched in October 2008.91
According to the requirements of the program, only a specific
group of investors are eligible for the mediation and arbitration
scheme.  According to the HKMA, a qualified candidate is one that
has:
1. MADE A COMPLAINT TO THE HKMA against a bank
that has sold him/her a Lehman-Brothers-related prod-
uct (not exclusive of mini-bonds), and
2. The HKMA has COMPLETED ITS REVIEW of the com-
plaint, and
88 Woon & Oscar, supra note 65, at 4.
89 Id.
90 Press Release, H. K. Int’l Arb. Ctr., Lehman Brothers-related Investment Prod-
ucts Dispute, October 31, 2008, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/
faq_b.htm [hereinafter LEHMAN DISPUTE RELEASE].
91 Id.
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3. EITHER the HKMA has referred the complaint to the
SFC for it to decide whether to take any further action,
OR a finding (of fault) against a relevant individual or ex-
ecutive officer has been confirmed by either the HKMA
or the SFC.92
Only individuals meeting the above requirements are eligible
for the HKMA sponsored mediation arrangements.  For eligible dispu-
tants, the HKMA pays the relevant mediation fees and banks are re-
quired to support the Scheme.93  Whether the bank ultimately agrees
to mediate depends on the circumstances of the case.  The principle of
voluntariness applies in all cases.  If both parties agree to settle, they
have the option of signing a legally binding agreement enforceable by
the court.94
According to information provided by the HKIAC,95 the
HKMA-sponsored mediation settlement amounts ranged from between
HK$40,000 to over HK$5 million (US$5000 to $650,000).  The parties
involved included eleven licensed banks in Hong Kong and individual
investors.  All of the mediation sessions, which took place within one
week of the appointment of the mediators, were concluded within the
time limit provided under the rules, which was not to exceed five
hours.96 While some have questioned the short mediation duration,
post-mediation interviews indicated parties were satisfied with the
usefulness of the mediation process and the professional performance
of the mediators.97
For unsuccessful mediations, parties had the option of proceed-
ing to binding arbitration conducted by the HKIAC.98  Therefore, if a
bank was willing to arbitrate the matter with an investor after a failed
mediation attempt, then the subsequent arbitration decision would be
legally binding on both parties.  However, because the arbitration pro-
cess was optional, and because the sales and purchase agreements
concluded between banks and Lehman Brothers mini-bond holders did
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Oscar Tan, There’s More to Mediation than Talking, THE STANDARD, October 22,
2008.
95 Press Release, Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Mediation 100%
Success for Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Product Cases (Feb. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.hkiac.org/documents/Mediation/News/090219_Lehman
Update_E.pdf [hereinafter Mediation Success Release].
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Nadia Darwazeh  & Friven Yeoh. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards
Under the New York Convention - China and Hong Kong Perspectives, 25.6 J. INT’L
ARB. 837, 837-56.
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not include relevant arbitration clauses, few banks were willing to pro-
ceed with this option.
Key Features of the Mediation Scheme
Several key features of the mediation scheme stand out and
deserve additional focus.99  These features include the active use of a
mediation “hotline,” pre-mediation briefings, and a mediation scheme
office.  First, a special hotline was set up to handle all enquiries in
relation to the Scheme.  The hotline is considered a vital channel for
banks and investors to initiate mediation.100  Hotline staff members
were trained in basic mediation skills and provided with adequate
knowledge to discern whether mediation should be made available to
the parties concerned.  The success of the hotline indicates that media-
tion schemes must not only be concerned with mediator abilities, but
with pre-mediation educational processes as well.
Second, pre-mediation briefings were conducted with individ-
ual banks and investors during which a practicing mediator would dis-
cuss the suitability of mediation with regard to a given case.101  Since
only a maximum of five hours were allocated for each mediation, the
HKIAC made use of pre-mediation sessions to allow disputants to
make informed decisions as to participation in the mediation ses-
sion.102  Since most of the investors did not have prior experience in
mediation or formal negotiation, preparation meetings were conducted
to familiarize them with the mediation process.103
Finally, the HKIAC also set up a Scheme Office to collect confi-
dential and privileged information from disputants. Banks often had
concerns regarding risk management, minimizing negative publicity
and strengthening client relationships, while investors often had con-
cerns beyond immediate financial losses.  With clear guidelines and
background information collected by the Scheme Office, designated
mediators were equipped with a greater understanding of the underly-
ing needs and interests of the parties involved.104
99 Woon & Oscar, supra note 65.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., HKMA Announces Mediation & Arbitra-
tion Services for Lehman Brothers-Related Cases, (Oct. 31, 2008).
103 Jody Sin, Mediation Tips, MEDIATE.COM.HK. (Jan. 10, 2010),   http://www.medi-
ate.com.hk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=260&Itemid=1.
104 Id.
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Interim Result of the Scheme
In November 2009, more than a year after the launch of the
Lehman Mediation Scheme, an interim report was conducted105 which
indicated that a total of 334 cases were referred to the SFC by the
HKMA, and around 243 cases were handled by the Scheme Mediation
Office.  Of the 243 cases, eighty-five mediations were conducted suc-
cessfully while the remaining cases were settled prior to the mediation
sessions.  For those who actually engaged in the Mediation Scheme,
the settlement rate was eighty-five percent.106
Drawing on the lessons learned from the Mediation Scheme,
the next section will explore the prospects for the development of an
In-House Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution System for Hong Kong Finan-
cial Institutions.
IV. REFLECTION ON THE LEHMAN BROTHERS MEDIATION SCHEME AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IN-HOUSE MULTI-TIER DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM FOR HONG KONG FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Presently, members of the Hong Kong public and government
are considering whether Hong Kong should implement a compulsory
in-house multi-tier dispute resolution system for financial institutions
in the region.  In examining this question, reference will be made to
the successful use of a multi-tier dispute resolution system by the
Hong Kong International Airport project a decade ago.107
Lessons Learned from the Existing Lehman Mediation Scheme
The Lehman Mediation Scheme provides a helpful illustration
of how mediation and arbitration can be used to resolve financial dis-
putes in Hong Kong.  Given the recent Civil Justice Reform of 2009,
which emphasizes case management and the use of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution,108 this Scheme was supported not only by the HKIAC
and HKMA but fully backed by the HKSAR Government and the Judi-
ciary.  Although judges and practitioners have historically acknowl-
edged the benefits of mediation in some landmark cases,109 mediation
has always been perceived as largely restricted to family matters.  It
105 Mediation Success Release, supra note 95.
106 Id.
107 See generally R.H. HASSON ET. AL., CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: HOW
TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (1998).
108 See generally H.K. GOV’T INFO. CTR., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 2009 – PUBLICA-
TIONS AND VIDEO, available at   www.civiljustice.gov.hk/eng/publication.html.
109 Ken To, CJR Watch: A Personal Notebook on the CJR Development, http://
cjrwatch.com/ (referencing some recent Hong Kong decisions on mediation).
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was not until the successful operation of the Lehman Brothers Media-
tion Scheme that the applicability of mediation and arbitration in
resolving commercial and financial matters received widespread
attention.
The Lehman Mediation Scheme was successful because of its
incorporation of the unique characteristics and needs of aggrieved in-
vestors.  Pre-mediation meetings110 were held to familiarize investors
with mediation procedures.111  In addition, the HKMA and SFC pro-
vided strong support in gathering background information while the
HKIAC provided the dispute resolution platform, all of which were
critical to the success of the Scheme.
In looking toward the potential future development of a finan-
cial dispute resolution body in Hong Kong,112 the following lessons
learned from the Lehman Mediation Scheme should be taken into ac-
count when designing such a system.
Observation #1: Expanding the Eligibility Test for Mediation and
Arbitration Services
Expanding the criteria, which defines eligible participants, is
one area of potential improvement on the Lehman Mediation Scheme.
As defined by the Scheme, only Lehman minibond investors whose
claims were approved by the HKMA and whose claims did not involve
complex questions of liability were eligible.113
Honorable Justice Fung, in the case of Leung Catherine v. Tary
Limited, commented on the need to expand the scope of mediation to
handle complex questions of liability.  In that case, solicitors for one of
the defendants refused mediation settlement attempts because the is-
sue of legal liability was in dispute.114  In response, Justice Fung ex-
plained that:
[T]o say that mediation is not suitable because the issue
of liability is in dispute is yet again a Catch-22.  It begs
the question of what mediation is, to wit, without
prejudice negotiations assisted by a neutral third party
to resolve disputes.  Courts in England as well as in
Hong Kong have observed that skilled mediators are able
to achieve results satisfactory to both parties in many
110 See generally Woon & Oscar, supra note 65.
111 See Sin, supra note 103.
112 Gary Soo, Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Year-End Reprt for
2009 from the Secretariat (2009), available at  http://www.hkiac.org/newspdf/
HKIAC_Year_End_Report_for_2009_from_Secretariat.pdf.
113 See To, supra note 109.
114 Leung Catherine v. Tary Ltd., [2009] H.K.E.C. 1669 (unrep., H.C.P.I. 805/
2007).
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cases quite beyond the power of lawyers and courts to
achieve.115
In light of such observations, expanding the scope of mediation to in-
clude not only simple but also more complex cases involving issues of
liability deserves further investigation.
Observation #2: Need for a Clear Dispute Resolution Roadmap116
In the few weeks after the Lehman Brothers’ Group filed for
bankruptcy, their minibond holders filed complaints with the HKMA
and SFC against their retail banks on allegations of mis-selling.117 Af-
ter the Mediation Scheme was established, investors began to have a
clear idea of how to seek compensation.  This experience indicates that
a clear picture of the avenues of redress at the outset of any financial
relationship118 will provide investors with a clear roadmap for
resolution.119
115 Id. (citing Dunnett v. Railtrack Plc., [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2434 (C.A.); Supply Chain
& Logistics Tech. Ltd. v. NEC Hong Kong Ltd., [2009]  H.K.C.U. 123 (C.A.) (unrep.
1939/2006)).
116 See Norbet Horn, Professor, University of Cologne, Remarks at the University
of Hong Kong (Apr. 15, 2010) (emphasizing “form requirements for arbitration
clauses with customers” for banks to customers (B2C Transactions)). See also
NORBET HORN, Arbitration of Banking and Finance Disputes in Germany, in
ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE, at 919-33 (Kroll et al.
eds., 2007).
117 See Siu Beatrice, Minibond Investors Fear Move Spells End for Claims, THE
STANDARD, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_de-
tail.asp?we_cat=4&art_id=79983&sid=23204415&con_type=1&d_str=20090324&
fc=1.
118 For example, a dispute resolution clause might include the following language:
“In the event a dispute shall arise between the parties to this sales and purchase
agreement of Lehman Brother’s minibonds, it is hereby agreed that the dispute
shall be referred to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre for arbitra-
tion in accordance with the applicable HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules.
The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and legally binding and judgment may be
entered thereon.  Each party shall be responsible for its share of the arbitration
fees in accordance with the applicable Rules of Arbitration.  In the event a party
fails to proceed with arbitration, unsuccessfully challenges the arbitrator’s award,
or fails to comply with the arbitrator’s award, the other party is entitled to costs of
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee for having to compel arbitration or de-
fend or enforce the award.”
119 See Dunnett, supra note 115; Supply Chain & Logistics Technology Ltd., supra
note 115.
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Observation #3: Protecting Investors in Post-Mediation Procedures
Under the Mediation Scheme, banks are under no obligation to
pursue settlement beyond mediation.120  One method of addressing
this gap is to make arbitration available to investors in the event that
mediation is not successful.  The following section looks in greater de-
tail at the design of a multi-tier dispute resolution system modeled
after the structure adopted by the Hong Kong Chek Lap Kok Interna-
tional Airport.121
Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution System
The use of a multi-tiered system of alternative dispute resolu-
tion is frequently credited with the “on-time and under-budget” com-
pletion of the Chek Lap Kok airport.  Given its sheer magnitude and
the fact that the project involved more than twelve different construc-
tion companies, the Hong Kong government used a carefully crafted
mix of alternative dispute resolution methods to resolve a wide range
of problems that could well have delayed, significantly increased the
cost of, or even prevented completion of this vast undertaking.  Clause
92 of the airport construction agreement outlined in significant detail
the Hong Kong government’s approach to the resolution of airport con-
struction related disputes.122
The first formal step envisaged by Clause 92 is known as a “de-
cision” of the engineer.123 Clause 92(3)(a) provides that this decision be
given within 28 days of service of the notice of dispute.  This type of
resolution is aimed at resolving disputes between employer and con-
tractor.  In this step, the engineer acts as a neutral party empowered
to exercise discretion and solve practical construction-related
problems.  The engineer’s decision is subject to the oversight by the
HKSAR government.  If the government has an objection to the deci-
sion, then the dispute is removed from the engineer’s jurisdiction and
proceeds to the next tier of resolution.124
120 LEHMAN BROTHERS MEDIATION SCHEME, supra note 60.
121 Mark Wilson, Hong Kong’s New Airport and the Resolution of Disputes, 25
HONG KONG L.J. 363 (1995).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. Clause 2(1)(b) of the airport agreement provides that:”Before carrying out
[any duty or exercising any authority conferred by the contract] the Engineer may
be required under the terms of his appointment by the Employer to obtain confir-
mation that the Employer has no objection to the Engineer’s proposed course of
action and, in the event of an objection, to act in accordance with the Employer’s
direction. . . .” Id.
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The second formal step is mediation.125  Under Clause 92 of the
agreement, if either party is dissatisfied with the decision of the engi-
neer, then that party may serve on the other a “request for mediation.”
This must be done within 28 days of receiving the engineer’s decision.
Under Rule 3.2 of the Mediation Rules,126 a valid request for media-
tion must include (1) a brief explanation of the nature of the dispute,
the amount (if any) in dispute, and the relief sought, and (2) nomina-
tion of a proposed mediator with an indication of his fee and other con-
ditions of such appointment.  If the other party agrees to mediation,
then the nominated mediator will take charge of the procedure.127  If
the other party disagrees with mediation and persists with the engi-
neer’s decision, then according to Clause 92, the parties can proceed to
the next tier of resolution.128
The third tier of this multi-tier dispute resolution model rests
on the selection of either adjudication or arbitration.129  In the Hong
Kong International Airport model, adjudication is only available when
the dispute involved simple monetary claims and the claimant desired
a speedy outcome.130  Arbitration, on the other hand, was available
when the dispute involved a complex legal or design issue.131
Under the rules,132 if the parties select arbitration, a notice of
arbitration must be sent in time to satisfy the ninety-day time limit.
125 Id.
126 Airport Core Programme Mediation Rules (1992).
127 Wilson, supra note 121.  Rule 5.2 provides: “Subject to Rule 7 in the absence of
service of a notice of objection in accordance with rule 5.1 [i.e. within seven days of
service of the request for mediation] the person nominated in the request for medi-
ation shall be deemed to be acceptable to the party receiving a request for media-
tion.”  Id.
128 LEHMAN BROTHERS MEDIATION SCHEME, supra note 60.  Refusal or failure to
respond to a request for mediation cannot be used by its recipient as a tactic to
block the appointment of a mediator.  In such a case the mediation procedure will
run its course with no long-term detriment to the claimant.
129 Id.
130 Id. Under Clause 92(7)(a), following an unsuccessful mediation (or an unsuc-
cessful attempt to initiate mediation), the dispute may be referred to either adjudi-
cation or arbitration. Interestingly, the sub-clause states that either party may
make the choice. A potential problem that arises out of clause 92(7) is that a party,
by acting quickly, could spuriously refer the dispute to arbitration in order to tem-
porarily hijack the contractor’s hopes of earlier relief through adjudication.  In re-
sponse, some have suggested that the election between adjudication and
arbitration be best reserved to the claimant – the party which initiated the unsuc-
cessful mediation.
131 Id.
132 For a quick reference of the rules, see Hong Kong International Arbitration
Centre, http://www.hkiac.org/content.php. See also Airport Core Programme Me-
diation Rules (1992).
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The respondent must send a “Response” to the claimant within
twenty-eight days of receipt of the notice ‘for the purposes of facilitat-
ing the choice of the arbitrator’.133  Article 3.3 of the Arbitration Rules
also envisages the appointment of an arbitrator by agreement of the
parties within forty-two days after service of the notice of arbitration;
if they fail to do so, either party is given the option of approaching the
HKIAC to make the appointment.134
Developing an “In-House Multi-tier Dispute Resolution System” for
Hong Kong Financial Institutions
A “multi-tier dispute resolution system” offers an avenue of re-
course for retail investors who purchase faulty investment products
through the banks and individual investment institutions.  The design
of such a dispute resolution system would require direct input from the
HKSAR Government, the HKMA, SFC, and retail banks.  The table
below represents a diagram of how such a multi-tier dispute resolution
framework might be structured:
133 Id.
134 Airport Core Programme Arbitration Rules (1992).
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Party-in-
Tier Type(s) charge Details
First Expert’s decision HKMA • The HKMA expert would be
empowered to discern whether the banks
have used any mis-selling techniques135
• Claimants must notify the HKMA
within thirty days after becoming aware of
the mis-selling practice.
• The HKMA would investigate the
matter and provide an expert decision on
the bank’s liability within sixty days of the
complaint.136
• The banks would be required to
initiate negotiations with investors within
seven days of the findings.  If the
negotiations fail, investors may proceed to
the next tier of resolution.
Second Mediation Nominated Following the negotiation stage,137 both
mediator or parties must agree on the selection of a
Hong Kong mediator within thirty days.  If the parties
Financial fail to select a mediator, the HKFDRC
Dispute may select a mediator on behalf of both
Resolution parties.  If a settlement is reached, both
Centre parties may sign an agreement to make it
legally binding.
Third Adjudication/ Adjudicators or • The claimant may select whether to
Arbitration arbitrators proceed with adjudication or arbitration
arranged by within sixty days from the date of a failed
the Hong Kong mediation.138
Financial • Both parties must agree on the
Dispute selection of an adjudicator.  If both parties
Resolution fail to agree, the HKFDRC may select an
Centre adjudicator for the parties.
• The selection of arbitration and
adoption of arbitration rules must be
agreed upon by both parties.  If the parties
fail to agree, the decision must be referred
to the HKFDRC.
In order for such a dispute resolution process to take effect, a
“multi-tier dispute resolution clause” must be inserted into a bank’s
investment product Sales and Purchase Agreement. The Hong Kong
government, through the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Se-
135 This is similar to “Engineer’s decision” of the Chek Lap Kok Airport model.
136 The bank should also try their best to investigate the matter in a speedy
manner, as timing is the key in financial disputes.
137 The deadline is seven days after the report of finding by HKMA.
138 The original claimant would enjoy sixty days to elect whether to undergo
adjudication or arbitration after the failed attempt of mediation (either failed
attempt in its real sense or if either party does not agree to mediation).
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curities and Futures Commission, can oversee the inclusion of such
clauses in banks Sales and Purchase Agreements with investors.
The focus of such a “multi-tier dispute resolution framework”
would be to target mis-selling techniques employed by banks and in-
vestment institutions.  Given such a focus, the claimant must initiate
dispute resolution within thirty days139 of actual knowledge that he/
she has been led to make an investment decision that he would not
have otherwise made or invest in a product that is not suitable given
his financial position, investment objectives, expectations and risk tol-
erance level.140  If the claimant becomes aware of the bank’s mis-sell-
ing but continues with the investment decision hoping to gain from
this mistake, then he proceeds at his own risk because he has made
such an investment decision with his eyes open.
Within thirty days, the investor must notify the HKMA of any
alleged mis-selling.  The HKMA would then investigate the matter in
order to discern whether the claimant made the investment decision
with his eyes open or was misled into purchasing the investment prod-
uct.141  The HKMA would then prepare an experts report within sixty
days of the complaint, and determine the question of the bank’s liabil-
ity.  Following the conclusion of such a report, the banks would then
initiate negotiations with affected investors within seven days.  The
HKMA and SFC may reserve the right to penalize banks for inappro-
priate investment sales techniques.
If the bank fails to approach the claimant for direct negotia-
tions before the deadline, then the claimant may nominate a mediator
within thirty days.  The mediator must be agreed to by all parties.  If
the parties fail to agree on a mediator, then the Hong Kong Financial
Dispute Resolution Centre (“HKFDRC”) may select a mediator on be-
half of all parties.  A pre-mediation meeting hosted by the HKFDRC
covering issues such as the process of mediation and the type of infor-
mation to prepare for the session would be a useful preliminary step
prior to the initiation of the mediation session.142
If the mediation does not result in a settlement agreement,
then the claimant may choose whether to initiate adjudication or arbi-
139 “Within thirty days of their acquisition of the knowledge” means that the
claimant may not take advantage of the situation by only complaining when the
investment decision results in a financial loss.  Therefore, the burden is on the
claimant to complain to the rightful authority within thirty days of becoming
aware of the misconduct of the investment institution.
140 ENFORCEMENT REPORTER, supra note 36.
141 See Barber Asia, supra note 61 (analyzing common law tortuous liability).
142 Sin, supra note 103.  The author is grateful to Ms. Jody Sin for her very helpful
tips for potential parties of mediation.
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tration within sixty days of the failed mediation.143  The claimant may
nominate the adjudicator (or arbitrator) and select the rules appropri-
ate for the proceeding.  In both cases, both parties must agree on the
selection.  If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the HKFDRC may
make the selection for the parties.
V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE OF FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
HONG KONG
The collapse of the Lehman Brothers Group, the fourth largest
investment bank on Wall Street,144 has led to greater awareness of the
insufficient protection against mis-selling techniques of various finan-
cial institutions.  The implementation of the Lehman Brothers’ Media-
tion Scheme by the HKSAR Government and the Judiciary, has
provided a useful base of experience from which to glean insights re-
garding the development of a financial dispute resolution mechanism.
An “in-house multi-tier dispute resolution system” drawing on the ex-
perience of both the Lehman Brothers’ Mediation Scheme and the
Hong Kong International Airport’s multi-tier dispute resolution sys-
tem sets out a potential framework for future investors to seek com-
pensation from negligent financial institutions145 first by an expert’s
decision, then mediation, followed by adjudication or arbitration.  It is
hoped that such a dispute resolution system developed for Hong Kong
financial institutions will assist in preventing costly and lengthy law-
suits and assist affected investors in seeking redress in the face of mis-
selling practices.
143 The idea is to prevent powerful financial corporations to select arbitration so
as to deter investors from further proceeding with the dispute.
144 HKMA, supra note 13.
145 Woon & Oscar, supra note 65.
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APPENDIX ONE146
Division of regulatory responsibilities for Authorized Institutions’ (“AIs”)
securities business under the Memorandum of Understanding between the
HKMA and the SFC
HKMA SFC
Registration
Institutional •To consider applications for •To grant, or refuse to grant,
registration Registration by AIs for carrying Registration to AIs to carry out
out regulated activities regulated activities
•To advise the SFC on whether •To maintain a register of
the applicant is fit and proper to institutions (including details of
be registered executive officers) and to make
the register available for public
inspection
Executive •To give, or refuse to give, •The public register maintained
officers consent to individuals to act as by the SFC should include
executive officers of registered details of the executive officers of
institutions registered institutions
Relevant •To maintain a register of
individuals relevant individuals (including
executive officers) and to make
the register available for public
inspection
Regulatory and supervisory processes
Developing •Responsible for establishing •Responsible for drafting rules
rules, codes, guidelines under the Business and publishing codes and
and guidelines Ordinance guidelines under the SF0
•To consult the SFC in the event •To consult the HKMA in the
that such guidelines apply to event that such rules, codes, and
registered institutions guidelines apply to AIs by reason
of their being registered
institutions
Exercising •The frontline supervisor of •To consult the HKMA before
Supervisory registered institutions exercising its powers of
functions •Responsible for the day-to-day supervision under s.180 of the
supervision of registered SF0 in relation to an AI
institutions
Complaints
Complaint To refer complaints to the SFC •To refer to the HKMA
referral whenever such complaints relate complaints concerning any
to matters that can be registered institution, or any of
investigated by the SFC under its executive officers or
s.182 of the SF0 or market managers.
misconduct.
146  HKMA, supra note 13.
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Division of regulatory responsibilities for Authorized Institutions (“AIs”)
securities business under the Memorandum of Understanding between the
HKMA and the SFC
HKMA SFC
Investigation
Conduct of For potential disciplinary cases: •To consult the HKMA before
investigations •to open a case for investigation exercising its power to initiate an
•to notify the SFC investigation under s.182(1)(e) of
•to keep the SFC informed of the the SFO
progress •To share the findings of its
•to forward to the SFC a copy of investigation with the HKMA
the investigation report, together
with the HKMA’s findings
•to report any relevant matter to
the SFC before completing the
investigation where appropriate
Disciplinary action
Consultation To consult the SFC before To consult the HKMA before
prior to exercising its power to: exercising its power to:
disciplinary • withdraw or suspend consent •suspend or revoke an
action given to executive officers of institution’s registration
registered institutions •reprimand, fine, or issue a
prohibition against a registered
institution, any of its executive
officers, managers or staff
Appeals
Conducting •To conduct appeals of HKMA •To conduct appeal of SFC
appeals decisions decisions
•To consult the SFC during the •To consult the HKMA during
course of an appeal where the course of an appeal where
appropriate appropriate
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\10-2\rgl201.txt unknown Seq: 28 18-MAR-11 14:50
